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Abstract
Background: Certification and accreditation are widely used to achieve quality and safety in health care but are also
questioned regarding their assumed effects. This is a challenge for policymakers and managers, since adoption of these
regimes can have a circumstantial impact upon organizations. This study’s aim was to explore how external conditions
catalyzed and triggered organizational change and internal sensemaking processes as part of an ISO 9001 certification
process.
Methods: The study applied an explanatory single-case design, using a narrative approach, to retrospectively follow a
sensemaking process in an emergency department in a Norwegian hospital undergoing ISO 9001 certification.
The certification process was a pilot initiated by a Regional Health Authority, which ran from autumn 2008
until spring 2012. Nine semi-structured, qualitative interviews were conducted, and documents in the form of
minutes and reports were collected. The data was analyzed according to an organized sensemaking framework.
Results: The adoption of the ISO 9001 certification did not follow a comprehensive decision-making process. Our study
shows two external situational triggers that initiated adoption. First, a countrywide supervision conducted
by the Norwegian Board of Health Supervision concluded that inadequate management and leadership
negatively affected the day-to-day running of Norwegian emergency departments. This external disruption
visualized longstanding organizational challenges that threatened the managers’ shared identity. A search
for meaning became prominent. Second, an occasional, externally initiated certification project was a plausible
solution that would lead to an immediate action that would reduce uncertainty. Institutional requirements
and concepts in the international ISO 9001 standard and in the national health regulations were unfamiliar and
ambiguous for the project group involved in the certification. These issues became the institutional external triggers for
intra-organizational sensemaking processes that made ISO certification possible. External assessments were acknowledged
as useful for making improvements.
Conclusions: By combining institutional theory with sensemaking theory, this case study contributes to a better
understanding of how external pressure meets micro-level change processes. These understandings are important
because environments give rise to adoption of different management tools, such as certification, but organizations
adopting new management tools seldom abandon others. This can lead to even more complex health care.
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Background
Accreditation and certification programs in health care
are used internationally to ensure, regulate and drive qual-
ity improvement and safety initiatives. Starting as a profes-
sional self-regulatory standardization and control initiative
in the early years of the twenty-first century, the number
of programs globally has grown tremendously in the last
25 years. In Norway such programs have no clear history
other than some small ad hoc initiatives. At a national
level, nationwide certification and accreditation programs
have been debated [1, 2] and were recommended by the
Government in 2015 [3]. Claims about a limited evidence
base and rigorous study designs of the effects upon recog-
nized quality measures have been put forward in several
international publications, especially in relation to how
many resources are allocated to accreditation and certifi-
cation systems internationally [4–6]. Recently, two up-
dated systematic reviews about the effects of certification
and accreditation [5] or external inspections [7] upon
process or clinical outcomes only found respectively one
and two studies that met their inclusion criteria. The
authors found no strong evidence to conclude about the ef-
fectiveness of certification or accreditation. Earlier reviews,
with broader inclusion criteria report in general inconsist-
ent findings on the relationships between certification and
accreditation programs and clinical performance and
outcomes, a positive trend about the programs ability to
stimulate improvement work and promote organizational
and cultural change and change in professional practice
concerned with quality of care, and contrasting views
among professionals towards accreditation [8–10]. Studies
of 89 European hospitals indicate that accreditation and
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9001
certification are positively associated with some quality and
safety structures and hospital outputs such as hospital
management, clinical practice, safety, patient-centeredness
and cross-border patient-centeredness. These studies dem-
onstrated that accreditation has slightly more impact than
ISO certification, but either system is better than no exter-
nal assessment [11, 12]. The recent EU project DUQUE
with data from 73 European hospitals studied the relation-
ship between ISO 9000 certification, healthcare accredit-
ation, and quality management. The researchers concluded
that accreditation and certification were positively associ-
ated with clinical leadership, systems for patient safety, and
clinical review, but not with clinical practice [13]. In a
Danish nationwide population-based study the researchers
reported a lower 30-day mortality risk for admissions at
fully accredited hospitals compared to admissions at
partially accredited hospitals [14]. Using an interrupted
times series analysis following one hospital in Abu Dhabi
over 3 years, the researchers showed that the positive
impact of healthcare accreditation on hospital quality
measures to some degree was maintained during the 3 years
accreditation cycle, but concluded that more focus on
continuous improvement methods to sustain the
positive impact form accreditation was needed, for in-
stance, frequently self-assessment or unannounced ex-
ternal reviews [15]. The use of unannounced external
reviews was recently studied in a nationwide cluster-
randomized controlled trial [16]. No difference
between announced and unannounced surveys in de-
tecting non-compliance with accreditation standards
in hospitals was found.
The uncertain relationship between adaption of differ-
ent accreditation or certification programs and quality
and safety objectives poses a challenge for policymakers
and managers. Despite these challenges, hospital certifi-
cation and accreditation are widely used and differ ex-
tensively in their purpose and organization [10, 17].
Certification and accreditation can therefore be consid-
ered as a legitimate and institutionalized means of regu-
lation of quality and safety in hospitals, and in complex
organizations they reflect contemporary tendencies of
means–ends decoupling [18]. In means–ends decoupling,
we see that the adoption of new policies or formal struc-
tures has a real impact upon change of organizational
activities and cultures, but there is limited evidence
linking these changes to organizational effectiveness and
outcomes (see Fig. 1).
Figure 1 presents the questions about why complex or-
ganizations allocate resources to practices that have a
scarce or diffuse known relationship to organizational
objectives. In hospitals, such objectives are most often
linked to better outcomes of patient care. This case
study takes these questions into a hospital context in
Norway, and investigates why and how an emergency
department (ED) adopted and was certified in the ISO
9001:2008 Quality management systems – Requirements
standard.
ISO 9001 certification—what is it?
ISO 9001 certification can be seen as an external con-
formity assessment or control mechanism to assure and
regulate quality and safety in health care. It is often
compared to or described interchangeably within the
“family” of external assessment strategies for health care
organizations, and especially accreditation [19, 20]. The
common purpose of these external assessment programs
is to provide information and evidence that the
organizational system and performance conform to a spe-
cific standard, and both certification and accreditation pro-
grams award the assessed organization with a certificate on
successful conformity. Certification bodies and auditors
should strive to build confidence and trust through a prac-
tice rooted in impartiality, competent assessments, and de-
cisions based on objective evidence [21]. The ISO 9001
standard does not prescribe performance requirements.
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Rather, it proposes generic requirements for structures and
systems that enable organizations to formalize production
or service processes into a series of procedures, and to con-
tinuously monitor, document and improve its efficiency
upon customer (patients) requirements and legal regula-
tions [22, 23]. An audit program has a 3-year audit cycle:
the initial certification process, two shorter “surveillance
audits” over the next 2 years, and then re-certification in
the third year.
Aim and research question
The aim of this case study is to explore external condi-
tions that may catalyze and trigger organizational change
[24–27], and internal sensemaking processes in the local
ED management [24] that led to the continuity and
change in favor of ISO 9001 certification. The following
research questions guided the study:
– How do external environments contribute to an
adoption of ISO 9001 certification in an emergency
department?
– How does the local management make sense of the
certification process?
This paper reports on the sensemaking processes in an
emergency department in a Norwegian hospital under-
going ISO certification. By combining institutional the-
ory with sensemaking theory, the paper contributes to a
better understanding of how external pressure meets a
local conceptualization of quality management processes
in ISO certification.
Theoretical approach
The rise in certification and accreditation practices in
healthcare [17] reflects the shifting mode in regulation
(often a reduction in “hard laws” and directives), spread
and diffusion of modern management tools, and de-
mands for accountability and transparency in our con-
temporary society. In this case study, we treat the
interplay between the enforced internal control regula-
tions and voluntary ISO certification from the perspec-
tive of re-regulation [28] or decentered or plural
regulation [29]. Typical of such regulation is the trans-
formation into modes of governance1; with or without
governments, often transnational in structure, and
represented by non-binding “soft” rules and regula-
tions. Such soft regulations are often diffuse and lead
organizations to search for other means and control
mechanism [28, 30].
To study the interplay between mandatory regulatory
demands in healthcare and the voluntary adoption of
ISO certification in a Norwegian hospital context, we
draw on the contributions of institutional and sensemak-
ing theory.
Institutional trigger
The present study emphasizes how macro institutional ele-
ments shape, trigger, or become situated by organizations
and individuals, but with less influence over the continuing
intra-organizational sensemaking processes [25, 27, 31].
People act and then use institutional structures to give
meaning to their actions. This perspective breaks with more
traditional perspectives where institutional environments
Fig. 1 Possible means–ends decoupling for ISO 9001 certification in hospitals. The figure is adopted and modified from Bromley & Powell [18]
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place cognitive constraints upon organizations and intra-
organizational processes by preclusion of other alternatives.
According to Weber and Glynn [25], there are three mech-
anisms in addition to traditional cognitive constrains
whereby institutional context affects sensemaking: priming,
editing and triggering. Institutional contexts, in their view,
refer to both the external institutional environment and in-
stitutionalized structures or scripts within organizations.
People acting in situations extract cues to activate sense-
making processes. In this case study, we follow the trigger-
ing mechanisms [25] which relate to how contradictions,
ambiguities, and gaps inherent in stable institutional struc-
tures create puzzles that require people to search for mean-
ing. For example, the Norwegian healthcare regulation and
the international ISO 9001 certification system represent
different institutional structures that when adopted are sup-
posed to constrain action. They also carry different legitim-
acy mechanisms that when adopted in different
organizational contexts have the potential to be ambiguous,
diffuse, or incomprehensible.
Sensemaking, turbulence, and change
The sensemaking perspective [24, 31, 32] helps to see
the micro processes that enfold when managers adopt
popular quality and safety programs, such as total qual-
ity management, six sigma, and LEAN management.
Adoption processes do not follow rational, instrumental
decision-making processes, rather they are filled with
constantly changing sensemaking processes in order to
give meaning to changing situations and outcomes
[31, 33]. Sensemaking is most evident when the world
is perceived to be different from its expected state or when
there are surprises [31]. Such diversity is described as
triggers or a discrepant set of “cues” [24] enacted by indi-
viduals. Cues can be small bits of information, events or
simple familiar structures, and people turn to earlier
scripts, schemes, or frames to ascribe meaning to cues
and decipher the situation. In other words, people are
guided by institutional constraints, organizational
premises, plans, expectations, acceptable justification, and
traditions inherited from predecessors [31]. Weick [24]
explains the sensemaking mechanisms that foster these
organizational processes as thoughts, feelings, and inten-
tions, the “intrasubjective meanings”, being merged into
“intersubjective meanings” through conversations. In
times of stability, individuals draw on common scripts and
frames to make sense of situations. But, in times of
turbulence and change, these “old” scripts no longer work.
A gap needs to be filled and an intersubjective or collect-
ive sensemaking process again becomes prominent.
People look for reasons to continue or resume their work.
In the search for reasons, sensemaking is about the
interplay of action and interpretation rather than the in-
fluence of evaluation on choice [31]. It is not about
accuracy and truth, but about plausibility. People continu-
ally redraft their stories in their search for meaning, so the
stories become more comprehensive and resilient to criti-
cism, and richer in data. Important in our case study was
how a local project group constructed a story that we re-
gard as collective shared meanings. Shared meanings is a
core theme for both crisis sensemaking and change sense-
making [26].
Methods
In this section we will describe the regulatory context of
Norwegian hospitals. Then we continue with design and
data collection and present our analytical framework.
Context and internal control regulation in Norway
The Ministry of Health and Care Services has the overall
responsibility for the specialized health care services in
Norway. Public hospitals are owned by the Government
and organized in four Regional Health Authorities
(RHA).
The regulation of quality and safety for health service
providers in Norway is based on a functional legislation,
outlined as enforced self-regulation [34], where different
regulatory requirements are based on an internal control
system [35]. Hospitals have in this perspective a great
deal of latitude to make decisions and set priorities
about their organization and services [36].
All hospitals, their service and health personnel, are
subject to supervision by the Norwegian Board of Health
Supervision (NBHS), through the 18 Offices of the
County Governors. The main supervision of hospitals is
performed as system audits, whose aim is to ensure and
control whether health services are complying with na-
tional acts and regulations. In practice it involves audit-
ing the health service’s internal control system.
In 2005, a RHA voluntarily adopted the ISO 9001 as a
guide for all its hospitals, in order to operationalize the
internal control system requirements [37]. It was argued
that an identified lack of follow-up on the internal con-
trol system could be connected with difficult conceptual-
izations, vague demands, and uncertainties about overall
quality management systems and its advantages [38].
Design
The present study is designed as an explanatory single-
case study [39]. For explanation building, we used a
narrative approach [40–45] and storytelling [46] to
retrospectively follow sensemaking during the local ISO
9001 certification process of an ED in a hospital trust
in Norway. The process ran from autumn 2008 until
spring 2012.
An overall story or narrative was produced during the
research process. It illustrates how those involved in a
local project group collectively made sense of the
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practices and experiences that unfolded during the certi-
fication process. The stories and meanings that the in-
formants provide about past experiences can in itself be
seen as a sensemaking process, as the nature of sense-
making builds upon frames that continuously change as
the informant act and acquires experience [24]. The nar-
rative can as such be seen as a co-construction between
the informants and the author (the researcher), in
addition to stories from documents (artefacts), and are
constructs through which events are made sense of
rather than just representations of these processes [40].
Sample and data collection
The case study relies on data produced from qualitative
interviews and documents [39, 47]. An initial explora-
tory interview was conducted in June 2011. Then docu-
ments and informants were selected for further study.
Data derived from documents took the form of minutes
of meetings and reports that were made available by in-
formants and official websites (Table 1). The main data
collection was performed during spring and autumn
2012.
Twelve informants were firstly purposefully selected.
All were managers and key personnel in the ED, head of
clinical and service departments, key personnel in the
certification process, and the project management in the
Regional Health Authority. After conducting eight inter-
views (Table 2), a distinct picture of the key local project
management for the certification process could be
drawn. The eight interviews revealed a distinct local or-
ganizing and sensemaking process, especially that of the
local project management (and the local ED manage-
ment, since managers were represented in the project
management).
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in June
and August 2012, according to an interview guide and
centered upon three themes: (1) the subjects’ role, the
organization, and aspects concerning quality and safety
work; (2) the certification process and its results; and (3)
how ISO 9001 standard and certification was understood
in relation to formal quality and safety regulations and
management tools. Open questions were generally used,
often followed by either preplanned or ad hoc probing
questions, in order to help subjects to recall and tell
more detailed stories about the ISO certification process
and their experiences.
Analytical framework and process
Organized sensemaking is primarily a process theory.
When conceptualized organized sensemaking can be
treated as a sequence of “ecological change—enactment—-
selection [and]—retention [31]”. Ecological changes in this
context are treated as both intra- and inter-organizational
environments. In the organizing process of enactment,
people are shaped by environments and sense anomalies
that are “…triggered by discrepancies and equivocality in
ongoing projects, [and] begin to change the flux of circum-
stances into the orderliness of situations” [31]. Selection is a
process of narrative reduction where possible meanings are
reduced and generate a tentative and plausible story. In re-
tention the plausible story is connected to past experience
and fit with identity, and such makes a new script or cogni-
tive frame that feeds back to the prior processes. In this
case study we have applied the following analytical categor-
ies, modified, and adopted from Steyer et al. [48], that aims
to emphasize the key elements in organized sensemaking
processes [24, 31, 49] (See Fig. 2):
Frame (retention): Involves cognitive frames (retained
plausible stories, such as acquired from work, training
or life experiences) and formal frames (e.g., categories,
plans, procedures, organizational structures, and arte-
facts). Frames are sources of guidance for interpretation
and action.
Cue: Information or event extracted from the environ-
ment by actors. People ascribe meaning to cues by relat-
ing them to frames.
Table 1 Data sources—documents
Data source Type of document Year Document title
Norwegian Board of Health
Supervision - Office of the
County Governor
Report 2007 Report from supervision of adequacy and quality in the
emergency department in somatic specialist health service
in xxx hospital
Norwegian Board of Health
Supervision
Report 2008 “While we are waiting….”—do patients receive adequate
treatment in accident and emergency units?
Regional Health Authority and
Norwegian Accreditation
Project description 2008 Accreditation in emergency departments “… for good and
equal health services”
Norwegian Accreditation Sector
committee P14 Emergency
departments
Report 2010 Report from the Norwegian Accreditation Sector Committee
P-14 Emergency Departments
Norwegian Accreditation Guidelines (including special or
extended scope of requirements)
2010 NA Doc. 59 Guidelines of ISO 9001:2008 for Emergency
Departments
Emergency Department Minute 2010 Evaluation meeting about ISO certification of the emergency
department 08.02.10.
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Discrepancy: Equivocality and discrepancies between
cues, and between cues and frames. It gives an occasion
to search for and reconsider a meaning. It is related to
the question “same or different” [31]. When a situation
feels different, it activates a search for meaning.
Concern: A tentative plausible story (e.g., an opportun-
ity, problem, perceived uncertainty, issue, or contro-
versy) that the individual or group pay attention to.
Action: Through action, people produce parts of their
environment and are “making” what is sensed [24].
People also enact what has been made sense of back into
the world. In this study the main actions are identified,
while acknowledging the challenge of simultaneously
identifying both action and cognition [48].
Our analytical process follows the principle of “narrative
analysis” proposed by Polkinghorne [50], incorporating
analytical features from Boje’s [45] causality analysis in an
antenarrative perspective. Our narrative follows the char-
acteristics of a narrated plot [42, 45, 50], where beginning,
middle, and ends of the story come into being. Such retro-
spective reconstruction often starts with the outcome as a
starting point for how this event came about. In this case
Table 2 Data sources—interview subject profiles
Formal position Role in the certification project Formal education
Head of Department, ED Leader of the local project group, and the
local pilot projects (EDs) representative in the
overall regional project organization
Intensive care nurse, Master of
Management
Head of Section, ED Member of the local project group Intensive care nurse, Master of
Management
Head of Unit-1, ED Member of the local project group Nurse, Ongoing (2012) Master of
Management
Head of Unit-2, ED Member of the local project group Emergency care nurse
Quality Advisor, Quality and
research department
Member of the local project group Nurse, Master of Management,
Quality studies
Project Leader, Regional Health
Authority
Project leader in the overall regional project
and focal point for the local pilot project in the
emergency department
Nurse, Master of Health
Administration, Quality studies
Head of quality and research
department
Allocated personnel to the local certification
project group
Unknown
Head of doctors, Department of
internal medicine
Managed doctors working in the Department
of internal medicine
Nurse
Fig. 2 Analytical categories. The analytical categories (shown in callouts) are used in this case study to emphasize the key elements in the conceptual
relationship among enactment, selection, and retention [31]. The figure is adapted from Jennings & Greenwood [66] and Weick 1979 [31]. Examples
from the present case study are put in parenthesis in each callout
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study the guiding outcome was the ED’s adoption of ISO
9001 certification. Our first analytical step was to arrange
the data elements chronologically and construct a baseline
story. The baseline story was modified in an ongoing
process along with a repeated reading of the interviews. In
our next step we identified elements that are contributors
to action and outcome [50]. Here the baseline story was
categories into our analytical framework (Fig. 2). Our final
analytical step was an ongoing construction (writing, cat-
egorizing, and rewriting) of the narrative into a temporally
patterned whole [50]. We have visualized in brackets the
categorization in the final narrative presented in this
paper, to make the analytical process more transparent.
To ensure trustworthiness, the narrative, with its analyt-
ical categories, was sent by e-mail to six of the informants,
who confirmed the narrative. Only slight changes in the
narrative were done after the informants’ responses.
Results
The story of change
The following story is presented in two stages. The first
outlines the initial establishment of the external project
that initiated the pilot process in the ED. The second
narrates the intra-organizational sensemaking that con-
tributed to continuity and change in favor of ISO 9001
certification.
Following up on unacceptable conditions in emergency
departments
In 2007 the Norwegian Board of Health Supervision
(NBHS) carried out a countrywide supervision of 27 out
of 54 hospital emergency departments in Norway, and
concluded that in general, there was a lack of manage-
ment responsibility for ensuring that daily tasks were
planned, organized, carried out, and improved in accord-
ance with legislative requirements [51]. The NBHS de-
scribed the situation as unacceptable and required the
management to take action.
As a direct follow-up of this report the Norwegian Ac-
creditation (NA)2 and one Regional Health Authority
(RHA) initiated a collaborative project. Its objective was
to set a standard that EDs could use to ensure and im-
prove internal control and management systems, and for
accreditation or certification purposes [52]. A sector
committee3 including an administrative project organization,
the regional project group (RPG), was established in the
spring of 2008.
The sector committee was composed of representa-
tives from all the RHA, NBHS, and other professional
experts, and their work took place from August 2008
until March 2010. The new accreditation standard for
EDs was supposed to concretize the generic require-
ments in the legal internal control regulation. The com-
mittee considered different management standards to
build upon or implement, and decided on the ISO
9001:2008 Quality Management System - requirements
standard, with its additional guidelines for use in health
services [23]. The main reason was that the ISO 9001
was in compliance with the current Norwegian internal
control regulation. Two ED was chosen as pilots for the
project, in order to (1) identify core processes and risk
areas to specify new requirements for EDs and (2) be-
come ISO 9001 certified and meet the new require-
ments. One of the EDs ended the process before
becoming certified, and the other, whose story is told in
the next section, became certified in 2010 [53].
The initial phase
The ED had struggled for years with a heavy and chal-
lenging patient flow, and worked to improve the system
without acceptable results [frame]. During this time
there had been a change towards more attention to qual-
ity improvement and control, both through central, re-
gional, and local initiatives. The RHA had become more
explicit on requirements about, among others, waiting
time for patients, patient safety, and prevention of infec-
tions [frame]. The ED was also in the middle of a re-
building and merging process to take over the
emergency functions from another hospital. The volume
of patients was high, they were kept waiting, and there
was not enough beds [concern].
The ED got two nonconformities from the country-
wide supervision that required managerial follow-up.
The first nonconformity pertained to the accumulation
of patients that could lead to failure of treatment; the
second was related to the examination conditions in the
ED, which did not ensure adequate protection of confi-
dentiality, patient integrity, and information exchange
[cue]. The challenges in the ED were once again
highlighted [cue] and the hospital top management be-
came more involved in resolving these challenges [dis-
crepancy]. The ED once again started to look for
solutions and make efforts to improve patient flow
[action].
Some months after the report from the NBHS, the
hospital trusts in the RHA were asked to participate in
the pilot project. The ED was then asked by their hos-
pital CEO [cue]. The Head of Department had a quick
consultation with middle managers in the ED, and the
response was “Yes, let us jump on it” (Informant Y).
They immediately decided to participate in the pilot [ac-
tion]. Their expectation was to get the assistance to
work systematically to resolve the challenges in the ED
[concern].
The process in the ED started in autumn 2008. The
first meeting was represented by people from the hos-
pital who delivered services to the ED (e.g., physicians
and the X-ray department) in addition to people from
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the regional project group. The intention was to anchor
the project with concern to those departments that de-
livered services to the ED, and not just the ED in isola-
tion [concern]. Especially, the integration of physicians
was considered important [concern]. The head of de-
partment was the hospitals representative in the RPG
and was highly involved in the development of the new
requirement for EDs during spring 2009. She also be-
came a key actor and a primer for the local pilot
throughout the project.
During spring 2009, the ED established a local project
group (LPG) led by the head of department and three
middle managers [action]. At that time they did not
know what to expect, other than they would be assessing
and describing processes, identification of system vulner-
abilities, and implementation of relevant actions in the
ED [discrepancy]. In any case, they immediately threw
themselves into the work, starting to describe processes
and identify vulnerabilities [action]. After a while they
were made aware of [cue] that the pilot project would
involve the use of the ISO 9001 standard [discrepancy].
Then they realized their need for local assistance about
developing quality management systems [concern]. A
quality adviser from the Quality and Research Depart-
ment integrated in the LPG [action]. The main work on
ISO 9001 certification began in the summer of 2009.
The standardization and certification phase: summer–
autumn 2009
The LPG worked enthusiastically and intensively, espe-
cially in July and August 2009. Most of the group mem-
bers worked extra to complete the work [action]. The
rest of the employees in the ED were less involved, limit-
ing their participation to some ad hoc working groups,
such as those to establish and revise procedures. Even
though the LPG had agreed that the main intention for
the ED was to review their management systems [frame],
there seemed to be a clear awareness among the LPG
members that the hard work on standardization con-
sisted of taking steps towards certification [concern].
They had an opportunity for external help with improve-
ment work, and this extra focus [cue] seemed to gener-
ate actions and a desire to demonstrate that they now
were able to succeed [concern].
[I]t was a combination of several things. […] When
the crisis is big, it’s even more important to get things
done. It’s a motivation in itself to do something—that
was important. We were selected from the Regional
Health Authority to accomplish this—that was an
important element. […] It turned out just like a
competitive element, just like: ‘This is something
we can master’. Clearly, much was done before the
certification body came in. We had been working
very much; however, they did the last part in order to
push us all the way to the end. (Informant Z)
None of the LPG members had experiences [frame]
with ISO 9001 standardization and certification pro-
cesses [discrepancy], except for one member of the qual-
ity department, who became an important “translator”
[cue] of the ISO standard during the pilot project. The
standard needed contextual adaptations to be legiti-
mated in the ED [concern]. Terms like risk assessments,
measuring, monitoring, and recording are obvious
concepts and parts of an ISO quality management sys-
tems, but it was an unfamiliar terminology for the LPG
[discrepancy]. The additional ED requirements devel-
oped during the project became important concretiza-
tions of the ISO 9001 standard and the internal control
regulations. It generated a contextual translation [cue] of
rather general requirements [discrepancy] and so ordi-
nated a meaningful operationalization in the ED [action].
As “newcomers” [frame], the LPG needed concretization
[concern].
The LPG referred favorably to the certification body.
In the first phase of preparing the ED for the initial
onsite document review, there was a large amount of e-
mail between the ED and the certification body. The
hospital received much advice and help on how to
improve the organization [cue]. The auditors were
considered very detailed, sometimes almost too much
[discrepancy], especially during document reviews and
the certification audit. At the same time the auditors
created confidence with their detailed knowledge and
ability to identify salient points and ask questions about
the documents and systems [cue]. They also transferred
experiences from other organizations and brought expert
knowledge on systems and change processes. The LPG
experienced the certification process more as guidance
than as control [discrepancy].
It was a turning point for the LPG when they re-
ceived feedback from the certification body and
gained experience from the standardization process it-
self [cue] that changed their understanding of systems
that they had considered well-functioning: “things that
we took for granted” (Informant Y), but were not
good enough [discrepancy]. They started working dif-
ferently with their systems [action] which generated
an improved overview of their organization and tasks
[cue], the number of procedures was reduced consid-
erably [cue], and explicit objectives for improvement
was created [cue]. The latter was a shift from describ-
ing objectives in general concerns, like “we should be
better at…” to develop measurable objectives that
could be monitored. The entire improvement and cer-
tification process [action] was considered as an im-
portant help [frame].
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The initial countrywide supervision pinpointed the
responsibility of other professions, especially physi-
cians, to hold them accountable for the challenges in
the ED [cue]. The emphasis on creating descriptions
and visualization of core processes in the ED [action]
made the department more visible and the process
was considered a key to the shared understanding
and commitment among leaders in other departments
[cue]. The certification body drove this accountability
concern further, and mutual contracts with “service”
departments (including physicians) was a requirement
for certification [cue]. “A milestone could be seen
when agreements with other heads of departments be-
came evident” (Informant X).
There were some worries among the employees in
the ED about the perceived absence of management
[cue], but the LPG did not enact any significant op-
position either inside or outside the ED [cue]. The
fact that the ED was a part of the pilot project and
was supposed to [frame] organize for and deliver a
service that was certifiable [discrepancy] was regarded
as an important driver, not just for the LPG but also
for other professions outside the ED that participated
in working groups. It seemed that “no one” would
contribute to the failure of a certification status, espe-
cially since it was decided at the top of the organization
and as a direct follow-up of the external supervision
[concern].
[T]he symbolic perspective of certification is just as
prominent as the rational. I believe that, and that’s my
conclusion. Much of the things that we initiate are
like that. Symbolic perspectives should not be
underestimated (Informant Z).
After following up on the nonconformities that were
given during the certification audit, the ED finally re-
ceived its first ISO 9001 certificate in January 2010.
The time after: winter 2010–summer 2012
According to the managers and the LPG, the ISO certifi-
cation process generated improvement of the manage-
ment system; however, a direct impact on patient
treatment was hard to demonstrate [frame]. ISO 9001
was considered as a managerial tool [frame]. When the
revised management system was contrasted with the
situation before certification, it illustrated both positive
practical implications and improved daily organizing of
the ED [frame]. The ED management started talking dif-
ferently about quality improvement, and used terms and
explanations that had originated from the standardization
and certification process [action]. They were proud of
their achievement and gladly shared their material and ex-
periences. The ISO standard and the additional
requirements for EDs were not considered the optimum
way of organizing, but it was treated as one way, among
many others, that generated system improvement [frame]:
[T]he fact that we are ISO-certified—as I say: We have
put some things in place; it is easier to find, easier to
breathe, you don’t need to doubt, you don’t have to
look; it is helping to create those secure frames. So
that those who work within these frames are given
the opportunity to flourish in the face of the patient.
(Informant W)
Even though the LPG considered the certification
process to imply system improvement [frame], they did
not expect that the employees would perceive quality
improvements, or associate system changes with the ISO
certification [concern], since the certification process did
not really affect the daily operations and patient treat-
ment. At least two other quality improvement initiatives
(triage and nurses’ continuing education) were initiated
in parallel with the certification process, and these were
considered to have more positive association with
improved treatment quality compared to the ISO certifi-
cation [cue].
The ED underwent two yearly surveillance audits4
conducted by the certification body after the initial certi-
fication audit. These external assessments were consid-
ered important for sustainability of quality improvement
[cue], even though the management understood that
quality improvement should be part of everyday practice
[discrepancy]. Whether these audits needed to be per-
formed by a third-party certification body was not con-
sidered of major importance, and neither was the
importance of the certificate in itself [Frame].
The ED management started to question the need for
further use of an external certification body [concern].
These concerns were based on (1) negative experiences
from the latest surveillance audit, where a new team
from the certification body conducted the audit [discrep-
ancy], (2) the costs and resources spent [frame], and (3)
having brought their quality management system to an
acceptable level. The ED management had generated
knowledge that enabled the ED to perform ongoing
system improvements on its own [frame]. However,
some sort of external audit was considered necessary
[concern]. Internal audits performed by the quality de-
partment in the hospital was in theory considered equal
with external audits, but in practice the external audits
(e.g., by a certification body, NBHS, or the RHA) had
stronger impact and triggered more managerial action
than internal audits [discrepancy]. Managers from the
LPG changed their perspective on audits, from seeing
them as a way of controlling organizations to something
useful for sustainable improvement [frame]. They started
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asking for internal audits and acknowledged the possibil-
ity of letting someone outside the department assess
their systems and give feedback [action]. Nonconfor-
mities were used as means for further improvement
[frame].
[F]or the last couple of years we have requested
audits, when there are things we are questioning. […]
It’s not so frightening anymore, and we see that it’s
very useful for us. That I think is a result of the
process. We are not so afraid of getting nonconformities,
and see that these [nonconformities] are things that we
can work on. (Informant V)
Discussion
As a result of the countrywide supervision, the Norwe-
gian EDs were turned inside out in ways that made it
obvious to ask whether it was safe to be a patient there.
The turbulence did not lead to additional formal na-
tional inquiries or major policy changes that we have
seen from turbulence or health care crises in other
countries [54], but it was thoughtless disruption or tur-
bulence that was a powerful occasion for organizational
change [26]. The story of the adoption of an unfamiliar
set of organizational requirements (ISO 9001), that had
a quite circumstantial influence on the local ED manage-
ment, fits at first glance into the picture of sensemaking,
where action and interpretation rather than evaluation
on choice were present in the first face of the adoption
process. A quick decision to become part of the pilot
project was taken in the face of longstanding challenges
in the ED related to patient flow and management sys-
tems. These challenges had become a frame of reference
for the management, and different initiatives to resolve
them had become discrepancies between what had been
expected and the reality. It was not a surprise or a shock
that prompted sensemaking, but ongoing discrepancies
as circumstances great enough to expect people to ask
for what is going on, and what should they do next. This
situation challenged the management’s social and shared
identity [24, 26, 31], as they were responsible for the
quality and safe running of the ED. Such an internal tur-
bulent environment can in itself be treated as a trigger
for managers’ engagement in sensemaking towards that
specific challenge or threat [55]. The importance here is
how the external environment triggered sensemaking
processes that initiated the adoption, continuation, and
change in favor of ISO 9001 certification and additional
standards. Four external triggers are identified. The first
two external triggers (nonconformities and regional cer-
tification project participation) were situational-specific
and present initially in the process. The last two triggers
are institutional in nature [25], derived from perceived
ambiguities in relative stable institutional structures (the
current internal control regulation and the ISO 9001
certification). These ambiguities triggered sensemaking
processes around continuity and change (the organiz-
ing processes) towards internal control systems and
certification.
Situational triggers
The first trigger relates to the nonconformities from the
countrywide ED supervision. For the ED management,
the nonconformities did not cause disruption, but rather
verification of known challenges. What they now per-
ceived as different from earlier (a discrepancy), was the
increased focus upon these known challenges and turbu-
lence from the hospital’s top management. Treated
institutionally, such an increased focus can be explained
by demands to follow up on nonconformities through
institutional coercion [56, 57] or regulatory enforcement
[58]. But in the sense that these onsite supervisions are
ad hoc initiatives, most often with years in between, they
also have the potential to cause careless disruption or
surprises for organizations that can offer strong occa-
sions for sensemaking. Basically, it can be an interrup-
tion produced by new and unexpected circumstances
[24]. This seems to be true in this case study, where the
received nonconformities made known challenges
“visible” [59] for other parts of the organization and es-
pecially the top management, and so triggered further
actions for control and accountability.
The second trigger relates to the way in which external
possibilities for assistance and support led to “quick” ac-
tion and interpretation. The ED management’s uncer-
tainty about proper solutions threatened their social
identity. The external possibilities for support prompted
almost immediate action. Organizational uncertainty can
be seen as a form of ignorance or an inability to extrapo-
late current actions and therefore foresee future conse-
quences [24]. Such occasions lead people to construct
processes of sensemaking to reduce that ignorance.
Plausibility and belief about current action, rather than
accuracy about the future, are salient in such sensemak-
ing processes. Early available sources and information
that gave some sort of plausible directions for the ED,
replaced uncertainty about the future, with more cer-
tainty about the present, and as such made it possible to
continue. The shared belief among the ED management
prompt action, rather than change resistance, that often
are seen in organizational change when identity is
challenged due to identity replacement, updating, or
transformation [26, 55].
Institutional triggers
The third trigger relates to institutional structures in the
current internal control regulation. Adoption of internal
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control system has shown to be a challenging task in
health care [60], and the ED did not have a system that
was clearly built up around a fulfillment of these regula-
tory requirements. Finding solutions to operationalize
these requirements was inherent in the pilot project.
The LPG’s work on concretizing the requirements and
developing additional requirements for EDs set in mo-
tion important sensemaking processes about the internal
control regulation. The internal control system is
founded in a functional legislation [34, 61] with a wide
scope and possibilities for organizations to choose
among a variety of tools for quality and safety work [62].
It is a form of soft regulation that can be (too) diffuse
and therefore trigger organizations’ search for control
[28, 30]. It becomes a question of transparency and ac-
countability [59], not just in the eyes of external actors,
but for the organizations themselves. Because making
things transparent is not just about documenting and
open the “curtains” for direct insight, it is also about
adopting new technologies that make organizational per-
formance visible [59]. The process of concretizing the
requirements in the internal control regulation that the
LPG performed was such a necessary visualization that
gave meaning to their own system and processes [32].
When analyzed from the perspective of Weber and
Glynn’s [25] institutional trigger mechanism, we see that
the stable institutional structure inherent in the regula-
tory system became ambiguous for the LPG and trigged
further sensemaking that made organizing possible.
These findings support other research arguing that a
lack of competence on developing internal control sys-
tems makes it difficult to adapt to the internal control
regulation in Norway [60].
The fourth trigger relates to the institution of ISO
9001 certification. The present case study shows that the
ISO 9001 standard consisted of general and unfamiliar
concepts and systems that triggered the LPG to find
ways to translate and contextualize these ambiguities, in
their efforts to make sense of the standard. Seeing the
ISO standard as a trigger relates to the same institu-
tional triggering mechanism as for the third trigger.
What is different about the institution of ISO 9001 certi-
fication is that it involves auditing process performed by
external auditors, and therefore integrates direct feed-
back mechanisms that are interlinked with sensegiving
perspectives [31, 63] or mechanisms on how institutions
edit sensemaking [25]. Auditors control, negotiate, and
guide during their interactions with the organizations,
and those tasks give auditors room for different interpre-
tations and conducts of their same auditing role. Con-
cerns about interaction are important, because research
on accreditation shows that when health professionals
are given the opportunity to participate in assessment
contexts that are collaborative and supportive, it can
self-reinforce a collaborative quality and safety culture
[64]. These considerations on the auditor–auditee en-
counter may also underpin our present findings where
there was a perceived discrepancy between the conduct
of the first audit team (performing both the initial certi-
fication audit and the first surveillance audit the first
year) and the conduct of the last surveillance audit team
the second year. The first team was perceived by the
LPG to have real impact upon the standardization and
improvement work in the ED. The conduct of the sec-
ond team was so different that it made the ED manage-
ment question the reliability of the certification process
and the meaning of renewing their certificate.
A recent study [65] on stakeholder perspectives identi-
fied four factors that seemed important to increase the
likelihood of a successful implementation of accredit-
ation: (1) the program is collaborative and valid and uses
relevant standards; (2) that accreditation is favorably re-
ceived by health professionals; (3) that healthcare organi-
zations are capable of embracing accreditation; (4) and
that accreditation is appropriately aligned with other
regulatory initiatives and supported by incentives. These
findings highlight external regulatory structures and
intra-organizational factors that seem to be in line with
findings on triggers and organizing perspectives related
to certification in our study.
Limitations
This single-case study is limited to meaning making pro-
cesses within a single emergency department in a single
hospital in Norway. The small sample is a clear limita-
tion of generalization from this study.
Conclusions
Certification and accreditation are widely used for qual-
ity and safety in health care but also questioned in re-
spect to their assumed effects. This is a challenge for
policymakers since these regimes can have a circumstan-
tial impact upon different parts of the organization. The
present case study shows that the adoption of the ISO
9001 certification in an emergency department was not
led by a comprehensive decision-making process. It
shows that an exogenous disruption visualized long-
standing organizational challenges that threatened the
managements shared identity. Again a search for mean-
ing became prominent. The occasional possibility for
help through an external standardization and certifica-
tion project was a plausible solution that led to immedi-
ate action, and reduced uncertainty. Further, the case
study shows that the relative stable institutional require-
ments that are inherent in the internal control regula-
tion and the certification standard were unfamiliar and
ambiguous and therefore triggered local sensemaking
processes for a contextualization of these regulations
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and standards, which made the continuation and change
possible. It also led to the acknowledgment of external
assessments or audits in general as useful for improve-
ment work.
When considering implications for further theory de-
velopment, we see that the institutional trigger mechan-
ism in Weber and Glyns’ [25] framework contributes to
explaining the occasion for sensemaking. There is a need
for more research that can refine this institutional mech-
anism (in addition to institutional constraints) and in-
form explanations of why some regulatory institutions
give rise to (trigger) adoption of different modern man-
agement tools (e.g., certification or accreditation). These
considerations are important, because when organiza-
tions adopt new management tools, they seldom
abandon others. This can lead to even more complex
health care.
Endnotes
1Governance in this perspective refers more to the
neoliberal approaches inspired by rational choice theor-
ies and governance as networks within the institutional
tradition, than to a decentered theory of governance
underpinned by postfoundational philosophy and demo-
cratic stands [67].
2Norwegian Accreditation (NA) is the Norwegian body
for accreditation of laboratories and sampling organiza-
tions, certification bodies, inspection bodies, and envir-
onmental verifiers. NA represents Norway on three
European and international bodies—the European co-
operation for Accreditation, the International Laboratory
Accreditation Cooperation and the International Ac-
creditation Forum. NA is also the Norwegian monitoring
body for Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) inspections,
according to OECD’s GLP principles (http://www.akkre-
ditert.no/en/om-oss/, accessed 12. February 2014).
3Norwegian Accreditation establishes different sector
committees, often broadly represented, when the aim is
to establish a new standard on a new domain or sector.
4Surveillance audit is a yearly onsite audit so that the
certification body can maintain confidence that the certi-
fied management system continues to fulfill require-
ments between (re-)certification and re-certification [21].
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